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ABSTRACT

Nowadays, considering the growing demand for the DC loads and simplified
interface with renewable power generation sources, DC microgrids (DCMG) could be
cost-effective solutions for the power supply in a small-scale area. The supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system maintains the bidirectional power
communication through the internet connectivity with the microgrid. However, this
intelligent and interactive feature may pose a cyber-security threat to the power grid. This
work aims at exploring cyber-security issues and their solutions for the DC-microgrid
system. To mitigate the adverse effects of various cyber-attacks such as the False Data
Injection (FDI) attack, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, etc., two new
techniques based on non-linear and proportional-integral (PI) controllers have been
proposed. Simulations results obtained from the MATLAB/Simulink software
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods in mitigating the adverse effects
of cyber-attacks on the DCMG system performance.
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Two papers resulting of this work have been used as the manuscript of this thesis.
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S. R. Akhter and M. H. Ali, “A Novel Solution to Mitigate Adverse
Effects of Single, Repeated and Simultaneous Cyber-Attacks on DC
Microgrid System”, in IEEE Transaction on Smart Grid. (Under Review)
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CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION

It’s been more than 150 years, the electric power has been commercialized and
since then it has always been a topic of argument on what form of electric power we
should choose for generation, transmission and distribution. Is that alternating current
(AC) or direct current (DC)? At that time Thomas Edison lost the great technological
battle known as “The war of currents” against George Westinghouse and Nikola Tesla,
and also he failed to establish the efficient DC power network model in front of AC
power network due to having a shortcoming of high distance transmission losses.
In recent times, the concept of localized, autonomous and resilient microgrid (MG) power
system has gained wider popularity [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Considering the
increasing demand for the DC-loads, simplified interface with the renewable power
generation, reduction in the usage and losses associated with the power-converters, the
perception of DC Microgrid (DCMG) could be a cheaper and more efficient alternative
for the power supply in small-scale areas like residential areas, university campuses,
offices, shopping malls, military bases, aircrafts, etc.
Furthermore, integrating the intelligence and internet connectivity, this microgrid
system will allow the consumers to engage with the main grid through smart metering
and ultimately that will result in dynamic demand-management. This publicized feature
makes the whole system into cyber-physical system, and ultimately that causes the issue
of cyber security. So, to ensure the reliable and resilient power supply, cyber security
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issues should be acknowledged and resolved. In this section, we will have a look at the
state-of-the-art of the DC Microgrid system and the cyber security aspect of it.
1.1

Background and Literature Review

1.1.1

DC Microgrid and its Control

DC MICROGRID:
The Microgrid (MG) concept considers a bunch of loads and micro-sources, in
terms of the production capability (50-100MW), functioning as a single controllable
system that provides power to its local area, both in stand-alone mode or the
interconnected mode with the conventional grid system. For the distributed generation
systems with the renewable resources, this microgrid concept is providing a new
architype for the future power industry, while depleting fossil fuels, increasing energy
demand, and need for high-reliable power supply have become some burning questions.
These microgrid systems allow bidirectional flow of power and also incorporate
communication channels along with the power network that provides better
controllability and introduces the active consumer participation.
Microgrids can be of two types, namely the AC microgrid that provides AC
power and the DC microgrid that provides DC power. In recent times, the renewable
energy resources are the main concerns, and Photovoltaic system, Fuel cell system,
Battery energy system all produce DC currents. Moreover, for capturing the maximum
power from the wind and to provide better quality of power, in wind power generation
system the AC power is first converted into DC, then converted into AC again. Thus, the
introduction of DC microgrid system will eventually minimize both the cost and the
2

complexity of the power network in terms of the reduced number of power converters.
From the load side, nowadays, the number of DC loads are increasing such as mobiles
phones, computers, the data centers that require DC supply, etc. In addition, the following
features such as
•

Simple power regulation

•

Absence of reactive power and frequency control

•

Decentralized planning and distributing

•

Low cost and high reliability

ensure better power quality with less power loss. Thus, the DC microgrid system can be
a good option for the data center, residential area, portable military bases, etc. [8], [9],
[1], [10], Fig. 1 clearly specifies the motivation for using the DCMG as future grid
system.
Integration
of renewable
energy
resources
Increased
end user
participation

Simplified
interface
with PV

DC
Microgrid
Better power
quality in
small scale
ares likes
military &
aircraft

Fig. 1:

Growing
ratio of DC
loads
Reduced
Number of
Converter
thus reduced
loss

Motivation towards DC Microgrid System.
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A general structure of the DC MG has been shown in Fig. 2. There are some
generation units, AC load, DC load, and ESS. Those are connected in parallel with the
DC bus through the corresponding AC-DC rectifier for the AC generation system such as
wind power system, DC-AC inverters for the AC loads, and DC-DC converters for the
DC loads and generation systems. The designed DC bus is connected with the main grid
system through a switching mechanism, so that the bidirectional power flow to and from
both the grids can be obtained. The total system is being monitored by the supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system that necessitates multilevel control
schemes for the DC MG system.

Fig. 2:

DC MG System incorporated with the SCADA system.
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DC MG CONTROL SCHEME:
The wider usage of the renewable energy resources, power electronics devices for
rectifier and converter, intelligent control among the DGs, proper voltage and current
sharing, power flow control, mode of operation with reliability and dynamic response all
make the management and control of DC MG system more multi-objective tasks, which
cover different methodological aspects, technicality, time scales and physical levels.
These domains necessitate the multilevel control scheme for the robust and reliable
operation of DC MG system. That includes the three principal control levels [5], [11],
[12] as follows:

Tertiary
level

• deals with supervision and optimization
• maintains overall system regulation
• observes grid parameters

• regulates the power quality
• maintains the coordination
Secondary
• synchronize the DC MG with the external grid
level

Primary
level

• controls the local power, voltage and current
• performes indivisual control action on each power converter
• follows the set point determined by the upper level

Fig. 3:

Control levels for DC MG.

Depending upon this multilevel control characteristics and the communication
links among the controllers, the total DC MG control system can be divided into four
major schemes. The Table 1 shows the basic conception and the scope of operation for
different control schemes:
5

TABLE 1. ANALYZING DIFFERENT CONTROL SCHEMES OF DCMG

Control
Features

Description

Scheme
Centralized

Conception

control

Collects and transmits information from and to local
DGs respectively.

scheme
[13], [14],

Fig. 4:
Advantage

Centralized Control.

▪ Include strong observability
▪ Straight forward implementation
▪ Overall controllability
▪ Suitable for localized and small size of MGs, where
the amount of information to be exchanged is
limited.
▪ Require less communication among the DG units, so
time delay issue can be minimized.
▪ Cost economic, as it uses only one central controller
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TABLE. 1 (Continued)
Control
Features

Description

Scheme
Disadvantage ▪ Single point failure issue, i.e., as only one controller
is being used, any breakdown of the controller will
affect the total system.
▪ Reduced flexibility and expandability
▪ Considerable amount of computational resources is
necessary.
Decentralized

Conception

control

Performs regulation based on the information from the
local measurement.

scheme
[15], [16], [17]

Fig. 5:
Advantage

Decentralized Control

▪ Independent control; does not require information
from other part of the system
▪ Controls respective unit relying on the local
information
▪ Real time communication is not required, thus
reduces the time delay.
7

TABLE. 1 (Continued)
Control

Control

Scheme

Scheme

Control Scheme
▪ Reduces computational complexity.
Disadvantage ▪ Global coordination is not possible due to lack of
communication among individual converters.
Incurs the cost as the number of controllers are
increasing
Distributed

Conception

Modern communication technologies (like- WiFi,

control

Zigbee etc.) and Information Exchange Algorithm

scheme

(P2P, Gossip, Consensus) motivate to go with this

[18], [12], [19]

control scheme. It performs regulation based on local
measurements

as

well

as

the

neighboring

communication.

Fig. 6:
Advantage

Distributed Control

▪ Allows the distributed controllers to communicate
with each other.

8

TABLE. 1 (Continued)

Control

Control
Control Scheme

Scheme

Scheme
▪ The information exchange algorithms allow the
parameters to come to a covenant quantity by
exchanging the information among the neighboring
controllers.
▪ A coordinated control can be achieved.
▪ Allows global measurement technique.
Moderate computational complexity.
Disadvantage ▪ Proper communication and information channel is
needed.
▪ Any of the controller’s discoordination may affect
the other’s performance.
▪ Time delay can be a major issue.
Increases the cost.

Hierarchical

Conception

▪ Due to increasing complexity of the energy

control

management system and required intelligence for the

scheme

controllers, the idea of this controller has been

[17], [20],

developed. It performs the regulation using different

[21], [22],

levels (upper and lower) by distributing the control

[23]

functions among all the levels.
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TABLE. 1 (Continued)
Control

Control

Scheme

Scheme

Control Scheme

Fig. 7:
Advantage

Hierarchical Control

▪ Functions provided by the centralized controller and
can be realized in a distributed way by the primary
controllers.
▪ Simple function can be provided to primary
controllers, that control basic voltage/current control
and power sharing.
Advanced control and management function can be
provided for the secondary controller, that coordinates the total system.

Disadvantage ▪ Involves high level of computational and intellectual
controller design.
▪ Global information is required, that may cause
serious time delay issue.
10

1.1.2

Cyber Security Issues and Solutions in Power System
The SCADA system necessitates multilevel control for providing reliability and

dynamic response for the DC MG system. This multilevel monitoring and control requires
the two-way communication among the main grid, DC MG and the SCADA system, thus
makes the total structure to a cyber-physical system. By introducing the communication
channels with computerized control system, the functionality and the efficiency of the
smart power network can be enhanced with dynamic demand management system. But this
potentiality can introduce the security vulnerability to such cyber-physical system. Several
types of cyber-attack [3] can take place in the DCMG based power network, such as:
•

Masquerading - Attacker pretends to be an authorized user of a system in order to gain
access to it or to gain greater privileges than they are authorized for.

•

Message Replay Attacks - Repeating the same outcome or making the constant image
of a data.

•

Eavesdropping - Capturing small packets from the network transmitted by other
computers and analyzing those data searching for information.

•

False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) - Attacker aims to attack and find any data as
long as it can result in a wrong estimation for the state variables of a system.

•

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) - Exhaust system resources by sending flood
request to prevent legitimate user from accessing the system.

•

Privacy Leakage on Meters - Utility usage information of the meter broadcast via
wireless network can be hacked.

•

Malware and Software Flaws - Inserting any malware or software, the system can be
vulnerable.
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In recent time, prognosticating the vulnerabilities in terms of security threats on
the modern cyber-physical power, lots of researches are going on for detecting and
managing the risk of cyber-attacks in the power systems. The work in [3] describes the
security vulnerabilities of smart power system specially on the DC microgrid and
discusses some possible forms of attacks such as Masquerading, Message Reply Attack,
Eavesdropping, False Data Injection (FDI), Distributed Denial of Services (DDOS),
privacy leakage on the smart meters. Beg et al. propose a method of FDI Attack (FDIA)
detection technique in DC microgrid system [24]. In this work, the DCMG properties are
referred from the Simulink/Stateflow to the Daikon tool, with the HYbrid iNvariant
GEneratoR (Hynger) interface that infers the candidate invariance, and using the
SpaceEx, the tool actual invariants are obtained. Any mismatch within those invariants
indicates the presence of FDIA. They carried on their research [25] and proposed another
FDIA detection technique using the Signal Temporal Logic (STL) that monitors the DC
bus voltage and current of the DCMG against specified data. This work also detects the
DDOS attack and provides a quantification of the attack impact demonstration for the
whole system in a hardware-in-the-loop environment. To justify the efficiency of the
literature based cyber-attack detection techniques, a realistic platform based on 13.8KV
DC and hybrid microgrid security testbed has been proposed in [26]. The performance of
the testbed has been evaluated from both software and hardware-based attack scenarios.
Very few works have been done on cyber-security issues considering the
photovoltaic system-based power model. The work in [27] represents a cyber-attack risk
assessment framework using the Markov Chain Process to provide the detection ability
for the microgrid control system and analyze the monitory impact of cyber-attack using
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the Monte-Carlo approach. Another risk assessment framework has been developed in
[28] for commercial photovoltaic plant in Spain called SOL-PV1 with 20MW capacity
examining the vulnerabilities and the attack vectors of the PV grid and categorizes some
unique features that will differ from system to systems in case of industrial control
strategy. A probabilistic approach for quantifying the uncertainties in the solar PV farms
using bootstrap Confidence Interval (BCI) has been proposed in [29] for the optimal
management and successful integration of PV farms with the main grid. Isozaki et al. [30]
focused on the effect of cyber-attack on voltage regulation at the distribution level when
the PV system is connected. They developed an algorithm for detecting the attack
through falsifying the measurement data of the sensor that enables the sectionalizing
switches. The constraint of the work is that it performs effectively only for limited range
of malfunctioned sensor data.
Among all the patterns of cyber-attack, considering the threat and their feasibility
in practical arena, the most common form of attack considered for research is the
False/Bad Data Injection where an intruder aims to attack any data as long as it can result
in a wrong estimation for the state variables of a system, and Distributed Denial of
Service that exhausts system resources by sending flood request to prevent legitimate
user from accessing the system. As this is the emerging field of power research, most of
the work till now explore in defining the possible adverse effects of cyber-attack at
different points of power system [31], [32], [33], [34] and determining the detection
technique of such kind of susceptibilities. For the FDIA, a data-driven approach to
distinguish between cyber-attack and physical fault using Sequential Minimal
Optimization (SMO) based support vector machine has been used in [35]. Different
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dynamic sate estimation based detection methods have been broadly discussed in several
literatures using deep learning [36], Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data [37], ChiSquare method and Euclidean distance detector [38], Markov Model for determining the
state space decision [39], Anomaly detection algorithm [40], and harmony search
algorithm using the K-nearest neighbor (KNN) [41]. Some other techniques such as the
Diagnostic Robust Generalized Potential (DRGP) technique [42], distributed block chainbased protection framework against DDOS attack through the communicating channel
[43], Parametric Feedback Linearization (PFL) based control scheme for the delay
minimization due to DDOS attack [44] show effective responses for the power grids.

1.2

Motivation
Based on the thorough literature search, all the works that have been carried out

till now for the DC Microgrid system or any other power system can be categorize into
three parts such as i) analyzing the risk and effect of cyber-attack on the power network
from the technical point of view, ii) quantifying the economic impact of such kind of
attack on the power system, and iii) detecting the cyber-attack on the power system. But
very few works have been done in distinguishing the attack from the other disturbances
and faults occurred in the power network. Specially in the DC microgrid concentration
very few works are available. More importantly, different studies considered only the
IEEE bus systems rather than modelling full-fledged microgrid platforms. Moreover, the
mitigation technique of the instability caused by cyber-attack has not properly been
studied yet.
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1.3

Objectives of the Thesis
The overall goal of this thesis is to explore new and effective control means to

mitigate the adverse effects of cyber-attacks on various components of the DCMG. To
achieve these goals, this thesis proposes to conduct the following specific research.
➢ A DCMG model consisting of PV system, fuel cell, battery energy storage and
PMSG based wind generator system has been developed.
➢ New solutions in the forms of non-linear controller as well as PI controller
have been developed to alleviate the adverse effects of various cyber-attacks
on the controller performance of the DCMG.

1.4

Novelty
The novelty of this work stands on the following facts.
➢ The cyber security issues and solutions for the DCMG have not been explored
yet in detail for the DC Microgrid system.
➢ This work proposes new control means and solutions to mitigate the adverse
effects of cyber-attacks on various components of the DCMG system.

1.5

Organization of the Thesis
The organization of the thesis is as follows.
➢ Chapter - 2 describes the DCMG system modelling for the analysis of the
cyber security issues and solution techniques. It also provides detailed
description on the proposed controllers.
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➢ Chapter - 3 shows and describes the simulation results and represents the
index-based performance evaluation measure for the proposed controllers.
➢ Chapter - 4 provides the conclusions for this work and proposes some future
scope of it.
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CHAPTER-2
DC MICROGRID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND CONTROL METHODOLOGY

From the concept of the DCMG system, it is clear that the presence of the
communication infrastructure makes the whole system cyber-physical. This chapter
describes the system modelling of the DC MG system and control, possible types of
cyber threats, their impacts and also control methodologies that have been implemented
for this research work.
2.1

Cyber Physical DC Microgrid Model
For the simulation, the system as shown in Fig. 8 has been considered, where

there is a solar panel with the Maximum Power Point Tracking (MPPT) system that
produces the duty cycle for the boost convert and provides power to the DC grid. A
battery energy storage system (BESS) is also equipped to minimize the power fluctuation
due to the temperature and the solar irradiation change. Moreover, a Fuel Cell (FC)
connected with a DC-DC Converter, a Permanent Magnet Synchronous Machine
(PMSG) based Wind Generation (WG) system equipped with a AC-DC inverter and a
DC load are connected with the DC bus that consume 5.112MW of power at 400V. The
power capacity of the PV, FC and WG are 3MW, 112.5KW and 2MW, respectively. The
designed DC bus is connected with the main grid via an inverter through a switching
mechanism that ensures the bidirectional power flow to and from the both grids. The
whole DC microgrid is controlled and monitored through the centralized control system,
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i.e., the SCADA, in different layers. Cyber-attacks may happen at any points of the
supervisory control. The different components of the DCMG system are explained below.

Cyber
Attack

SCADA
PI/Non-Linear Controller for Cyber Attack Mitigation

Controlled Controlled
D
R

Main
Grid

DC Bus
Boost
converter

Inverter
DC link
Capacitor

PV
System

MPPT
Duty
Control Cycle

DC-DC
Converter

DCMG

DC link
Capacitor

Control Flow

Load

Battery Energy
Storage

Cyber Attack
DC link
Capacitor
AC/DC
Inverter

DC-DC
Converter

Fuel Cell System

DC link
Capacitor

PMSG
Based WG
System

Controlled
α

Controlled
D

Fig. 8:

Thyristor Firing
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DC microgrid system supervised by SCADA system.
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PHOTOVOLTAIC (PV) SYSTEM:
Among many other renewable resources like hydro, geothermal, wind, biomass,
etc., nowadays the solar system or more commonly known as the photovoltaic (PV)
system has engrossed the considerable amount of attention of the power engineers [45],
[46]. According to the US Department of Energy, the installation of solar power system
has grown seventeen-fold from 1.2 gigawatts (GW) in 2008 to an estimated 30 GW
today. This amount capacitates to deliver the power almost at 5.7 million regular
American homes. Again, the cost of solar panels and the price of the solar power have
been dropped by about 60% and 50%, respectively [47].
The photovoltaic system model used in this research is exemplified in Fig. 8,
where the system consists of solar module that produces the Direct Current (DC) due to
the solar irradiance penetration on the solar cell surface, a DC-DC boost converter to
match up the voltage at the terminal of DC microgrid, the MPPT system to regulate the
PV voltage and current as well as the power. The DC link capacitor is coupled before the
DC bus.
Fig. 9 shows the equivalent circuit of individual PV cell that includes one diode,
one shunt resistance, Rsh (with high value in KΩ range) representing the leakage current
loss, and the series resistance, Rs (very small value) that represents the losses due to
metallic contacts (grid contacts, current collecting bus, etc.).
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IL

ID
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D

Rsh

I
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+
V

Fig. 9:

Equivalent circuit of solar cell.

The current produced by the PV can be represented by the following equations [7], [31]:
𝐼 = 𝐼𝐿 − 𝐼𝐷 − 𝐼𝑠ℎ
𝐼𝐷 = 𝐼0 {𝑒𝑥𝑝 [
𝐼 = 𝐼𝐿 − 𝐼0 {𝑒𝑥𝑝 [

𝑞𝑉𝐷
] − 1}
𝑛𝑘𝑇

𝑞𝑉𝐷
𝑉𝐷
] − 1} −
𝑛𝑘𝑇
𝑅𝑠ℎ

(1)
(2)

(3)

where IL is the photo generated current, ID is the current across the diode, Ish is the
shunt current, I0 is the reverse saturation current, n is the diode ideality factor (1 for an
ideal diode), q is elementary charge, k is Boltzmann’s constant (1.38*10−23 J/K), T is
absolute temperature, and VD is the diode voltage.
The voltage produced at the terminal of the PV cell can be represented by:

𝑉 = 𝑉𝐷 − 𝐼𝑅𝑆
𝑉=𝑛

𝑘𝑇
𝐼𝐿 − 𝐼
𝑙𝑛 (
+ 1) − 𝐼𝑅𝑆
𝑞
𝐼0

(4)
(5)

As the power produced by the solar cell is very low, the series-parallel
combination of the solar string helps achieve the desired power level. In this work, the
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Helios USA 9T6 420W solar module has been used [48]. The 1800 parallel stings with 4
series strings are used to obtain the 3MW power at required 400V DC considering the
solar irradiance and the temperature of 1000 W/m2 and 25°C, respectively. The Perturb &
Observe MPPT algorithm [49], which produces the duty cycle, D, for the DC-DC boost
converter has been used. In this work, the optimal value of D is considered as 0.5 with the
upper and lower bound at 0.58 and 0.38, respectively.
The DC link voltage VDC, i.e., the voltage output of the boost converter is
obtained depending upon the duty cycle, D, and the PV terminal voltage, VPV, as
represented by the following equation [45]:
𝑉𝐷𝐶 =

𝑉𝑃𝑉
1−𝐷

(6)

BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM (BESS):
The Battery Energy Storage System used in this work and shown in Fig. 10
comprises the battery, DC-DC Buck/Boost converter, and DC link Capacitor.

Lf

Battery
R0

+
Vt

-

IGBT 1

g1
Rf

Discharging
Signal
g2

IGBT 2

DC Link Capacitor

Charging
Signal

+
VDC

-

Fig. 10: Equivalent circuit of Battery Energy Storage System.
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The output voltage of the battery is dependent upon the State of Charge (SOC)
and has the following relationship:

𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉0 [

𝑆𝑂𝐶
]
1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝑆𝑂𝐶)

(7)

Where, V0 is the voltage when the battery is fully charged at no load, as defined
by the Nominal voltage parameter and β is the parameter that determines the charge and
discharge characteristics of the battery.
The DC-DC Buck/Boost converter using the insulated-gate-bipolar-transistor
(IGBT) switches has the main purpose to control the DC link voltage by properly
charging and discharging the battery. In this BESS modelling, a proportional-Integral (PI)
controller has been used to determine the switching frequency, the gate signal (g1 and g2)
for the IGBTs depending upon the difference of load power and the generated power.
When the load power is less than the generated one, the converter works in the boost
mode, and when the load power is greater, then it switches to the buck mode. The
operation of the BESS can successfully handle the impact of temperature and solar
irradiance variation on the PV system and enhance the PV power quality as shown in Fig.
11. In this work, the battery energy storage system works for energy management
purpose during the solar irradiance variation in the PV system.
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Fig. 11: Performance of Battery Energy Storage during solar irradiance variation.
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FUEL CELL (FC):
Fuel cells are power generation devices that convert chemical energy directly into
the electrical energy. In the basic construction of the fuel cell there are two electrodes
named anode and cathode, an electrolyte substance that carries electrically charged
particles from anode to cathode and also catalyst that speeds the reaction at the
electrodes. Hydrogen is the main input for the fuel cell and this power generation process
is very environment friendly as the byproduct of this chemical reaction is only the water.
There are different kinds of Fuel cell, the most commons are proton exchange membrane
fuel cell (PEMFC), direct methanol fuel cell (DMFC), alkaline fuel cell (AFC),
phosphoric acid fuel cell (PAFC), molten carbonate fuel cell (MCFC) and solid oxide
fuel cells (SOFC) [50], [51], [52]. In this research work, the PEMFC has been used.
Though the working principle of the FC varies for different types, but the basic is to
ionizing the hydrogen atom at the anode then allowing the electrons to pass through the
cathode that completes a full path thus produces direct current (DC) [53]. And the
protons are passed through the electrolyte mix up with the oxygen of the air and produces
water. In Fig. 12, the basic operation of the fuel cell has been shown. Here the electrolyte
plays the important role as they control the right path for electrons and protons and
permit the electrons only to flow toward the cathode. Though the fuel cells are the
environment friendly source of power, but it is highly expensive due to cost of hydrogen
as well as the electrolyte. Moreover, it produces a good amount of heat when the
hydrogen gets ionized.
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PMSG BASED WIND POWER SYSTEM:
The basic principle of the wind power system is to convert the wind energy into
mechanical energy by rotating the turbine with force of the wind and finally this rotation
of turbine produces the electrical energy. The power captured by the wind turbine can be
expressed as [54],

𝑃𝑚 =

1
𝜌𝜋𝑅2 𝑉𝑤 3 𝐶𝑝 (𝜆, 𝛽)
2

(8)

Where,
Pm : extracted power from wind [W]
Ρ : air density [kg/m3]
R : blade radius [m]
Vw : wind velocity [m/s]
λ : tip speed ratio
β : blade pitch angle [deg]
Cp : power coefficient which is a function of both λ and β.
In this work, the Type-4 wind turbine [55] i.e., the permanent magnet
synchronous generator type variable speed wind power system has been used. The main
reason of using the PMSG is to avoid the separate excitation system for the field and the
power electronic inverter/converter system allows the variable speed of the wind, and
thus the maximum wind power can be captured. As the power production from a wind
turbine is a function of wind speed, most wind turbines begin to produce power at wind
25

speeds of about 4 m/s (9 mph), achieve rated power at approximately 13 m/s (29 mph),
and stop power production at 25 m/s (56 mph). There is a pitch control system in WG
system that usually maintains the pitch angle to uphold a constant output power at the
terminal of the generator when the wind speed is over the rated speed. In this work, a
constant wind speed of 15m/s has been considered and the system generates 2MW of
power.

2.2

Possible Cyber Threats
As shown in Fig. 8, the DC microgrid is connected with the main grid system and

the total cyber physical system is being monitored by the SCADA system in different
layers. The SCADA is a kind of centralized control system architecture for any power grid
that stores, monitors and process all the data available to the power network. SCADA
includes the usage of computers, programmable logic controllers, data communication
channels, graphical user interface (GUI) system, high level of network observatory
system, etc. As all the controller set points are handled through the SCADA, it is possible
to tamper any kinds of data from there or destroy the interface with the grid that may
result in an unexpected unbalanced situation. For example, an intruder can change the
value of duty cycle, which is the input to the boost converter of the PV system, abruptly to
any value. The information of duty cycle can be missing from the boost converter. Again,
an attacker can attack on the load profile that will cause the change in the load value at the
SCADA, whereas the physical load value will remain unchanged. In all of these cases, the
physical system will receive misleading information from the SCADA and will result in
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deviation of PV array terminal voltage, the voltage and power at the DC microgrid
terminal.
Moreover, since every controller has some reference values, an intruder can easily
change that set point, and thus can hamper the performance of the controller. For example,
in the battery energy storage system, an intruder can change the reference value of the
power. In that case, the controller will not be able to provide the optimum power required
for the system at that moment, and that will hamper the performance of the power system,
and also the consumers will be affected with the high or low voltage causing from the
variable nature of the solar or wind. If such situation continues for longer time, the
equipment attached to the power system will be damaged and the whole system may be
shut down.

DISTINGUISHING CYBER ATTACKS FROM OTHER DISTURBANCES:
As already mentioned, to consider the cyber-attack scenario, in this work four
parameters have been chosen, i.e., the duty cycle of the DC-DC boost converter of the
photovoltaic system, reference value of the firing-angle controller of the AC-DC inverter
of the PMSG based variable speed wind power generation system, reference value of the
battery energy management system controller and load profile. All these quantities are
independent of the fault or any other transient instability scenario in the grid. The duty
cycle usually varies with the change in solar irradiance and the temperature in case of the
PV system or with the fuel cell dynamic in case of the FC system. This type of variation
is time dependent and does not change instantly or abruptly. Again, during a faulty
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condition, the reference values of the controller never be changed, it only happens if
somebody manipulate those values intentionally. Similarly, in case of load, its value
never varies with the fault. The only parameters that can vary are the voltage that may go
very low and the current that may become very high. The value of the load may vary with
respect to the demand throughout the day, but this will not happen abruptly or
enormously, as load profile is always maintained and monitored according to the grid
code by the SCADA. Whereas in case of FDI cyber-attack, the parameters can be
changed to very sudden and unusual values, or in case of DDoS attack, due to the flood
of data suddenly some delayed response may occur. Therefore, by recognizing the
pattern of the duty cycle and load profile at the SCADA, the cyber-attack scenarios can
possibly be recognized. In this work, the main concentration is to show the cyber-attack
mitigation effects using the proposed controllers.

2.3

Proposed Control Methodology

PROPOSED CONTROLLERS FOR MITIGATION OF ADVERSE EFFECTS OF
CYBER-ATTACKS:
In this work, two types of controllers, such as a simple non-linear controller and
the PI controller have been used to mitigate the adverse effects of cyber-attacks on the
PV system performance. The control algorithm and the controller description are
provided in the following.
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A.

Control Algorithm:
All kinds of vulnerabilities in a power system have direct impact on the terminal

voltage. So, the main objective is to regain the voltage at its required level within the
shortest possible time. Thus, the DC link voltage, VDC, has been used as the controller
input. This voltage is compared with the reference voltage of VDC (400V) to get the
error function ∆VDC. These voltage values are converted into per unit quantities with the
base value of 400V. Fig. 12 Shows the basic algorithm of the proposed cyber-attack
mitigation techniques.
In case of normal situation, the error value is zero. The controller continuously
monitors the voltage deviation at the DC bus. In case of any deviation in ∆VDC, the
controller will first check whether there is any cyber-attack in the system or any other
disturbances. In that case, all the set point values will be checked. If the set point values
are unchanged, then the system will detect other disturbances and accordingly suitable
controller will be activated. But if any of the set point value is changed, then the cyberattack will be detected. In this work, as the focus is to mitigate the cyber-attack effect, the
controller will check for the location of the cyber-attack depending upon the manipulated
parameter. This can be detected by monitoring the performances of the individual
distributed energy resources (DER), because the cyber-attack impact will be higher on
that specific DER where the attack has occurred. Again, if there is any deviation in load
value, R, then the controller for the R value correction will be enabled and will ensure the
voltage deviation at zero. When the system will be stable, the controller will get
disconnected immediately and the system will resume its original connections.
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Fig. 12: Proposed control algorithm.
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It is to be noted here that, the controller will be secured in a black box/ hidden box
that will generally remain out of data cloud of the SCADA so that no intruder effect can
hamper this controller. This will come into action only when it is required for a short
period of time, suppose for 2-3 seconds, and once the system comes back, the controller
will again be disconnected and out of the communication channel. This very small action
time of the controller will not be enough for the intruder to understand the control system
and thus the controller will be secure.

B.

Non-linear Controller
As the power grid is highly non-linear, application of non-linear controllers in

power grid is highly preferred. This control action can be governed by any nonlinear
differential equations or any other mathematical model. In this work, two simple
exponential equations have been used as the nonlinear function shown in the following:

1 − 𝐾2 𝑒 −|∆𝑉𝐷𝐶|𝐾1

(9)

𝐾2 𝑒 −|∆𝑉𝐷𝐶 |𝐾1

(10)

𝐾2 𝑒 −|∆𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑|𝐾1

(11)

Where K1 and K2 are the constant values and ∆VDC is the input to the controller. By tuning
the values of K1 and K2, the required controller values of the manipulated signal are
obtained. Equation 9 is used for the cyber-attack mitigation in case of load and the duty
cycle, D, in case of PV and FC with different values of K1 and K2. Similarly, equation 10
is used for regaining the reference values of the AC-DC converter in case of the WG
system and equation 11 is for the battery energy management system. The parameters
31

have been set in a way so that the controller can handle any kind of voltage deviation from
very high to very low. The parameters of the controller have been shown in TABLE 2.
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Fig. 13: Proposed Non-linear controller.
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+

-
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Fig. 13 represents the block diagram of the nonlinear controller. One controller is for the
duty cycle correction that can handle both the FDI and DDOS attacks with the same
parameter value, and another one is for the load correction.
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Fig. 14. Proposed PI controller.
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+

D

The PI controller is one of the popular controllers that is being extensively used in
industrial control. Fig. 14 shows the block diagram for the PI controller. This also works
the same way as the nonlinear controller in two parts for duty cycle and load variation.
The transfer function that has been used for the PI controller in Laplace domain
(s) is as follows:

𝐷 = |∆𝑉𝐷𝐶 | [𝐾𝑝 +

1
𝐾]
𝑠 𝑖

(12)

Where Kp and Ki are the proportional and integral gain of the PI controller,
respectively. ∆VDC and D are the input and output variable of the controller, respectively,
and bear the same meaning as mentioned in the previous subsection. The values of the
parameters Kp and Ki are shown in TABLE 2, in the next page. These values have been
obtained by trial and error and it can handle any abrupt change in the input from high to
low.
The attack scenario cases mentioned in the following table are described in the
Table-3 in Chapter-3.
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TABLE 2.

Attack

PARAMETER VALUES OF THE CONTROLLER FOR CYBERATTACK

Attack

Non-linear Controller

PI Controller

Scenerio
Point

K1

K2

Kp

Ki

Case -I

D of PV

0.735

0.5

0.9972

0.896

Case-II

R

0.0215

0.9468

0.34

0.09

D of PV

0.735

0.5

-

-

R

0.0215

0.9468

-

-

Case-IV

Pref

0.0735

3e6

-

-

Case-V

D of FC

0.735

0.36

-

-

Case-VI

Vref

0.0735

400

-

-

Case-III

2.4

Conclusion
This chapter describes the modelling of the DC Microgrid system used for the

analysis of the cyber security issues and solution techniques. It also explains the cyber
security threats towards the power system, especially in PV connected DC Microgrid
system. And finally, this chapter provides detailed description on the proposed controllers
along with parameter values.
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CHAPTER-3
EFFECTIVENESS TESTING OF PROPOSED CONTROLLERS FOR
MITIGATING ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CYBER-ATTACKS

In this chapter, the effectiveness of the proposed controller in the DC microgrid
system has been evaluated. The evaluation has been shown through some graphical
images obtained from the real time simulation and also mathematically by calculating the
percentage improvement from the voltage index value. The details are described in the
following subsections.
3.1

Simulation Condition
The simulations are performed through the MATLAB/Simulink Software. In the

simulation study, constant irradiance and temperature in case of PV system and constant
wind speed in case of wind power system have been considered. Since these parameters
vary gradually with time and any cyber-attack may happen within few seconds, these
changes will not impact much. In all cyber-attack cases, the mitigation controller has
been activated after 0.1 sec of the occurrence of attack. This 0.1sec time has been
considered as time delay to allow the sensor to choose the right type of controller based
on the location of attack to mitigate the adverse effects of cyber-attacks. The time step of
the simulation is 5µsec for all cases.
The scenarios that have been considered in this work are briefly listed in the
following table based on the pattern, type and location of the attack.
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Table 3. CYBER-ATTACK SCENARIO
Case of study

Scenario

Case-I
Attack on
Photovoltaic
System

1
2
3
4
5

Case-II
Attack on
Load Profile

Pattern of Attack
Single Attack
Random Attack
Repetitive Attack

1

Single Attack

2

Repetitive Attack

1

Case-IV
Attack on
Battery
Energy
Storage (BES)
Case-V
Attack on
Fuel Cell
System
Case-VI
Attack on
PMSG based
Wind Power
System

1

1

1

Location of Attack

FDI
DDoS
FDI
DDoS
FDI

Duty Cycle of the
PV Boost
Converter

FDI

Load Profile

FDI

Duty Cycle of the
PV Boost
Converter and Load
Profile
simultaneously
Duty Cycle of the
PV Boost
Converter and Load
Profile
simultaneously

FDI

Reference value of
the BES control
scheme

FDI

Duty Cycle of the
DC-DC Converter
of the Fuel Cell

FDI

Reference value of
the Firing angle
(Alpha value)
controller of the
AC-DC converter
in WG system

Single Attack

Case-III
Simultaneous
Attack
2

Type of Attack

Repetitive Attack

Single Attack

Single Attack

Single Attack
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3.2

Cyber Security Issues and Solution for DC Microgrid System

3.2.1

Cyber Attack on PV System

A.

CASE-I; SCENARIO-1
Effects and Solution of FDI Attack on Duty Cycle of The PV Boost
Converter:
In case of the false data injection attack scenario, it has been considered
that, at 0.5 sec of simulation, the intruder attacks on the duty cycle at the input of
the DC-DC boost converter. Figs. 15-18 show the responses of four parameters,
such as the duty cycle, PV array voltage, DC grid Voltage, and output power
respectively. As shown from the responses, the duty cycle increases to its 90%
value which is a very high value as it’s range typically varies from 0-1 only. Also,
the terminal voltage of the PV array goes close to zero, and the DC grid voltage
and the power at the grid become very low.
In that situation, to recover the steadiness of the grid, the controller has
been activated at 0.6 sec. For the PI controller case, the duty cycle comes back to
0.5 value within almost 6 sec. Comparing to that in case of the nonlinear
controller the duty cycle comes back at the desired value immediately within 1
sec. As the D value is recovered, both the voltages at the terminal of PV array and
the DC grid gradually come back to the 400V level. Following the voltage, the
output power is also improved. It is quite certain that in all four cases the
performance of the nonlinear controller is much better that that of PI controller.

38

Fig. 15: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on duty cycle of the PV boost
converter scenario and mitigation effect on the duty cycle.

Fig. 16: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on duty cycle of the PV boost
converter scenario and mitigation effect on the PV array terminal voltage.
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Fig. 17: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on duty cycle of the PV boost
converter scenario and mitigation effect on the DC microgrid terminal
voltage.

Fig. 18: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on duty cycle of the PV boost
converter scenario and mitigation effect on the Power at DC microgrid.
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B.

CASE-I; SCENARIO-2
Effects and Solution of DDOS Attack on Duty Cycle of the PV Boost
Converter:
The DDoS is another very frequent type of cyber-attack. It causes flood
data that prohibits the normal data flow through the communication channel. So,
the system will get no signal for few moments or longer period of time. In the
case of the DDoS attack, the scenario has been simulated such as the intruder
attacks the duty cycle by making it zero in the boost converter input at 0.5sec.
Figs. 19-22 show the responses of the duty cycle, voltage at both the terminal of
PV array and the DC grid, and the load power, respectively. From these figures, it
is clear that the sudden absence of duty cycle in the DC-DC Boost converter
makes the system vulnerable. To handle such situation, the controller has been
activated at 0.6sec, and both the controllers attempt to make the duty cycle value
at 0.5 at the terminal of boost converter. From the results it is visible that the
performance of the non-linear controller and the PI controller is significantly
different. For every case, the non-linear controller performs almost instantly after
the activation and helps the duty cycle and DC grid voltage come back instantly at
their rated values of 0.5 and 400V, respectively. But in case of PI controller, the
duty cycle value restored almost after 7 secs, and the PV array voltage took long
time to get stable, although the DC grid terminal voltage and the output power
came back after 5 seconds.
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Fig. 19: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on duty cycle of
the PV boost converter scenario and mitigation effect on the duty cycle.

Fig. 20: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on duty cycle of
the PV boost converter scenario and mitigation effect on the PV array
terminal voltage.
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Fig. 21: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on duty cycle of
the PV boost converter scenario and mitigation effect on the DC microgrid
terminal voltage.

Fig. 22: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on duty cycle of
the PV boost converter scenario and mitigation effect on the Power at DC
microgrid.
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C.

CASE-I; SCENARIO-3
Effects and Solution of Random FDI Attack on Duty Cycle of the PV Boost
Converter:
In case of the random false data injection attack scenario, it has been
considered that, at 0.5 sec of simulation the intruder attacks with random change
in value of the duty cycle at the input of the DC-DC boost converter of the PV
system. Figs. 23-26 show the responses of four parameters, such as the duty cycle,
PV array voltage, DC grid Voltage, and output power. As shown from the
responses, the duty cycle varies randomly within 10-90% value. Also, the
terminal voltage of the PV array, the DC grid voltage and the power at the grid
varies randomly from very low to high values in an inversely proportional manner
with the duty cycle change.
In that situation, to recover the stability of the grid, the controller has been
activated at 0.6 sec. For the PI controller case, the duty cycle comes back to 0.5
value within almost 6 sec. Comparing to that in case of the nonlinear (N-L)
controller the duty cycle comes back at the desired value immediately within 1
sec. As the D value is recovered, both the voltages at the terminal of PV array and
the DC grid gradually come back to the 400V level. Following the voltage, the
output power is also improved. It is quite certain that in all four cases the
performance of the nonlinear (N-L) controller is much better that that of PI
controller. This proves the robustness of the controllers, that means they can
handle any abrupt changes properly within very short period time.

44

Fig. 23: Random FDI attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the duty cycle.

Fig. 24: Random FDI attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the terminal voltage of PV array.
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Fig. 25: Random FDI attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the voltage at DC link.

Fig. 26: Random FDI attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the load power.
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D.

CASE-I; SCENARIO-4
Repeated Attack
Till now the cyber-attacks that occurs once in a system have been
discussed. Now the aim is to explore more worst scenarios by imposing the
repetitive attack. That means, once an attack has been mitigated, another attack
will affect the system one more time. It may continue for a longer time so that the
whole power system may exhaust and fail. This can be considered as one of the
severest case of cyber-attacks.
In this situation, the aim is to control such repetitive attack scenario using
controller. As from the above cases, both single attack and random attack, it is
clearly visible that the non-linear controller outperforms the PI controller. For that
reason, in the following works, only the non-linear controller for the cyber-attack
mitigation purpose has been considered.
Effects and Solution of Repeated DDoS Attack on Duty Cycle of The PV
Boost Converter:
In the case of the repeated DDoS attack, the scenario has been simulated
such as the intruder attacks the duty cycle by making it zero in the boost converter
input at 0.5sec. After one second (1.5 sec) the attack has been removed, but again
after two seconds (3.5 sec), the intruder imposes the manipulation for one more
second and the attacker follows the similar pattern of repeated DDoS attack for
rest of the time. Figs. 27-30 show the responses of the duty cycle, voltage at both
the terminal of PV array and the DC grid, and the load power, respectively. From
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these figures, it is clear that sudden absence of duty cycle in the DC-DC Boost
converter makes the system vulnerable. To handle such situation, in each time of
attack the controller has been activated after 0.1 sec of attack time considering the
delay and when the intruder removes the attack, the controller again gets
deactivated ensuring the stability. Suppose, for the 1st attempt, the attack happens
at 0.5 sec and the controller gets activated at 0.6sec. The non-linear controller
attempts to make the duty cycle value at 0.5 at the terminal of boost converter.
From the results it is clear that the non-linear controller performs rapidly and
within 0.3sec the optimal value is regained in all of the cases.

Fig. 27:

Repeated DDoS attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the duty cycle.
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Fig. 28: Repeated DDoS attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the PV array terminal voltage.

Fig. 29:

Repeated DDoS attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the DC link voltage.
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Fig. 30: Repeated DDoS attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the load power.

E.

CASE-I; SCENARIO-5
Effects and Solution of Repeated FDI Attack on Duty Cycle of The PV Boost
Converter:
In the case of the repeated false data injection attack scenario, it has been
considered that, at 0.5 sec of simulation the intruder attacks on the duty cycle at
the input of the DC-DC boost converter. After one second (1.5 sec) the false data
has been removed, but again after two seconds (3.5 sec), the intruder imposes the
false data for one more second and the attacker follows the similar pattern of
repeated attack for rest of the time. Figs. 31-34 show the responses of four
parameters, such as the duty cycle, PV array voltage, DC grid Voltage, and output
power. As shown from the responses, the duty cycle increases to its 90% value
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which is a very high value. Also, the terminal voltage of the PV array goes close
to zero, and the DC grid voltage and the power at the grid become very low.
In that situation, to recover the imbalance situation of the grid, allowing
the signal delay the controller has been activated after 0.1sec of the attack in
every repeated stage at 0.6 sec, 3.6 sec, and 6.6 sec, respectively. For the
nonlinear controller, the duty cycle comes back at the desired value properly
within very short time (0.4 sec). As the D value is recovered, both the voltages at
the terminal of PV array and the DC grid gradually come back to the 400V level.
Following the voltage, the output power is also improved.

Fig. 31: Repeated FDI attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the duty cycle.
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Fig. 32: Repeated FDI attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the terminal voltage of PV array.

Fig. 33: Repeated FDI attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter
scenario and mitigation effect on the DC link voltage.
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Fig. 34: Repeated FDI attack on duty cycle of the PV boost converter scenario
and mitigation effect on the load power.

3.2.2

Cyber Attack on Load Profile

A.

CASE-II; SCENARIO-1
Effects and Solution of FDI Attack on Load:
In this case, the attack has been simulated in a way that at 0.5sec the
intruder changes the value of the load from the original set value of 0.0533Ω to a
high value of 0.3Ω. For such high value of load, the terminal voltage of the DC
grid rises up to 558.4V. As a result, the maximum power point condition gets
diverged and the power goes very low. And the system becomes unstable. In this
situation, at 0.6sec the controllers have been activated to stabilize the system by
setting back the load. Figs. 35-38 show the responses of the duty cycle, voltage at
both the terminal of PV array and the DC grid, and the load power, respectively.
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Fig. 35: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on load scenario and
mitigation effect on the Duty Cycle.

Fig. 36: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on load scenario and
mitigation effect on the PV array terminal voltage.
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Fig. 37: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on load scenario and
mitigation effect on the DC microgrid terminal voltage.

Fig. 38: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on load scenario and
mitigation effect on the power at DC microgrid.
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B.

CASE-II; SCENARIO-2
Effects and Solution of Repeated FDI Attack on Load:
In this case, the similar attack pattern has been followed as the repeated
FDI attack on duty cycle. At 00.5sec the intruder changes the value of the load
from the original set value of 0.0533Ω to a high value of 0.3Ω. For such high
value of load, the terminal voltage of the DC grid rises up to 558.4V. As a result,
the maximum power point condition gets diverged and the power goes very low.
After one second (1.5 sec) the false data has been removed, but again after two
seconds (3.5 sec), the intruder imposes the false data for one more second and the
attacker follows the similar pattern of repeated attack for rest of the time. In that
situation, to recover the vulnerable situation of the grid, the controller has been
activated allowing the signal delay after 0.1sec of the attack in every repeated
stage at 0.6 sec, 3.6 sec, and 6.6 sec, respectively. In this situation, at 0.6sec the
controllers have been activated to stabilize the system by setting back the load.
Figs. 39-42 show the responses of the duty cycle, voltage at both the terminal of
PV array and the DC grid, and the load power, respectively.
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Fig. 39: Repeated False Data Injection (FDI) attack on load scenario and
mitigation effect on the duty cycle.

Fig. 40: Repeated False Data Injection (FDI) attack on load scenario
and mitigation effect on the terminal voltage of PV array.
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Fig. 41: Repeated False Data Injection (FDI) attack on load scenario and
mitigation effect on DC link voltage.

Fig. 42:

Repeated False Data Injection (FDI) attack on load scenario
and mitigation effect on load power.
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3.2.3

Simultaneous Cyber Attack

A.

CASE-III; SCENARIO-1
Simultaneous Attack on the Multiple components of DCMG:
Cyber-attack can happen at many locations of a power system. An intruder
can target more than one location at a time. If happens so, then it will be very
challenging to mitigate such vulnerabilities, because the attack in various location
at the same time will have devastation effect on the system. In this section, it has
been considered that the intruder attacks through false data injection both at the
DC-DC boost converter of the PV system as well as the load profile. Again, in
this case, the effect of single attack scenario and the repeated attack scenario will
be observed. Then the performance of the existing controller will be observed
whether it can withstand in such extreme situation or not.

Effects and Solution of Simultaneous FDI Attack on Both Duty Cycle of the
PV Boost Converter and Load:
In case of the false data injection attack scenario, it has been considered
that, at 0.5 sec of simulation the intruder attacks both on the duty cycle at the
input of the DC-DC boost converter and the load profile. The intruder increases
the duty cycle value and make it 90% and simultaneously change the load value
from 0.0533Ω to a high value of 0.3Ω. Figs. 43-46 show the responses of four
parameters, such as the duty cycle, PV array voltage, DC grid Voltage, and output
power, respectively. As shown from the responses, the duty cycle increases to its
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90% value, the terminal voltage of the PV array goes close to zero near around
50V, the power at the grid become very low (almost 800KW) and the DC grid
voltage become higher (approximately 480V instead of 400V).
In that situation, to recover such instability of the grid, the controller has
been activated at 0.6 sec. As a result, the duty cycle comes back to 0.5 value
almost immediately within 0.25 sec. and the load value is resumed. As a result,
both the voltages at the terminal of PV array and the DC grid gradually come
back to their desired level. Following the voltage, the output power is also
improved. It is quite certain that in all four cases the performance of the nonlinear
controller is compatible.

Fig. 43: Simultaneous False Data Injection (FDI) attack on Both Duty
Cycle of the PV boost converter and load scenario and mitigation effect on
Duty Cycle.
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Fig. 44: Simultaneous False Data Injection (FDI) attack on Both Duty
Cycle of the PV boost converter and load scenario and mitigation effect on
terminal voltage of PV array.

Fig. 45: Simultaneous False Data Injection (FDI) attack on Both Duty
Cycle of the PV boost converter and load scenario and mitigation effect on
the DC link voltage.
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Fig. 46: Simultaneous False Data Injection (FDI) attack on Both Duty
Cycle of the PV boost converter and load scenario and mitigation effect on
load power.

B.

CASE-III; SCENARIO-2
Effects and Solution of Repetitive Simultaneous FDI Attack on Both Duty
Cycle of the PV Boost Converter and Load:
For the repetitive simultaneous false data injection attack scenario, it has
been considered that, at 0.5 sec of simulation the intruder attacks both on the duty
cycle at the input of the DC-DC boost converter and the load profile. The intruder
increases the duty cycle value and makes it 90% and simultaneously changes the
load value from 0.0533Ω to a high value of 0.3Ω. Then after one second both of
the attacks have been removed and imposed 2 second later. This pattern follows
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for the rest of the time. In every case, for the mitigation, nonlinear controller is
activated after 0.1second allowing the delay, thus the system stability is regained
properly. Figs. 47-50 show the responses of four parameters, such as the duty
cycle, PV array voltage, DC grid Voltage, and output power, respectively.

Fig. 47: Repeated simultaneous False Data Injection (FDI) attack on
Both Duty Cycle of the PV boost converter and load scenario and
mitigation effect on Duty Cycle.
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Fig. 48: Repeated simultaneous False Data Injection (FDI) attack on
Both Duty Cycle of the PV boost converter and load scenario and
mitigation effect on terminal voltage of PV array.

Fig. 49: Repeated simultaneous False Data Injection (FDI) attack on
Both Duty Cycle of the PV boost converter and load scenario and
mitigation effect on DC link voltage.
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Fig. 50: Repeated simultaneous False Data Injection (FDI) attack on Both
Duty Cycle of the PV boost converter and load scenario and mitigation
effect on load power.

3.2.4

Cyber Attack on the Battery Energy Storage

A.

CASE-IV; SCENARIO-1
Effects and Solution of FDI Attack on the Refence Value of Battery Energy
Storage Control System
In case of the false data injection attack scenario on the Battery Energy
System (BES), it has been considered that, at 0.5 sec of simulation the solar
irradiance goes down to the value of 800 W/m2. As a result, the load power goes
low as well, and the BES starts providing power to the grid to minimize the power
fluctuation. In that situation at 1.5 sec, the intruder changes the reference value of
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the BES management controller from 3MW to 4.5MW, and consequently the
performance of the BES is hampered and the load power drops to 2.4MW and the
voltage also go down at 360V instead of 400V. Fig. 51 shows the BES
performance during the irradiation change before the occurrence of FDI attack
and Figs. 52-54 show the responses of three parameters, such as the DC grid
Voltage, output power at the load and power provided by the battery, respectively.
In that situation, to mitigate the adverse effect of the cyber-attack at 1.6
second, the nonlinear controller gets activated and tries to regain the reference
value to its original set point. Within less than one second the BES starts
providing optimum power and thus grid power is recovered.

Fig. 51: Battery Energy Storage Performance during the irradiation
change before the occurrence of FDI attack.
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Fig. 52: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on the Battery Energy Storage
scenario and mitigation effect on the DC link Voltage.

Fig. 53: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on the Battery Energy Storage
scenario and mitigation effect on the load power.
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Fig. 54: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on the Battery Energy Storage
scenario and mitigation effect on power provided by the battery.

3.2.5

Cyber Attack on the Fuel Cell System

B.

CASE-V; SCENARIO-1
Effects and Solution of FDI Attack on the Duty Cycle of the DC-DC
Converter of Fuel Cell System
In case of the false data injection attack scenario on the Duty Cycle of the
DC-DC Converter of Fuel Cell System, it has been considered that, at 1.00 sec of
simulation the intruder changes the value of the duty cycle of the DC-DC
converter of the fuel cell from 0.64 to 0.15. As the value goes very low, the FC
power also drops down from 115.2KW to 2.1KW. Figs. 55 and 56 show the
responses of the Duty Cycle and the output power of FC, respectively.
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In that situation, to mitigate the adverse effect of the cyber-attack, at 1.1
second the nonlinear controller gets activated and almost immediately it regains
the duty cycle value to its original set point, as well as the power also comes back.

Fig. 55: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on the duty cycle of the DCDC converter of fuel cell system scenario and mitigation effect on the
Duty Cycle of FC.
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Fig. 56: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on the duty cycle of the DCDC converter of fuel cell system scenario and mitigation effect on the
power provided by the FC.

3.2.6

Cyber Attack on the Wind Power System

C.

CASE-VI; SCENARIO-1
Effects and Solution of FDI Attack on the Voltage Reference Value of the
Firing Angle Controller of AC-DC Converter of PMSG based Wind Power
System
In case of the False Data Injection (FDI) attack scenario on the voltage
reference value of the firing angle controller of AC-DC converter in PMSG based
wind power system, it has been considered that, at 0.5 sec of simulation the
intruder changes the voltage reference value of the firing angle controller from
400 to 100. This firing angle controller takes the DC link voltage as input of the
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controller to produce the required firing angle, α. Thus, with the change of the
reference value it generates inappropriate angle value that hampers the conduction
of the AC-DC converter. As a result, the DC link voltage as well as the load
power goes low from 400V to 370.5V and from 5.115MW to 4.388MW
respectively, as shown in Figs. 57-59.
In that situation, to mitigate the adverse effect of the cyber-attack, at 0.6
sec the nonlinear controller gets activated and within 0.7 second it regains the
reference value of the voltage. As a result, the alpha value comes back to its
required value to produce the 5.112MW of power at 400V value at the DC grid.

Fig. 57: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on the voltage reference value
of the firing angle controller of AC-DC converter in PMSG based wind
power system scenario and mitigation effect on the firing angle.

71

Fig. 58: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on the voltage reference value
of the firing angle controller of AC-DC converter in PMSG based wind
power system scenario and mitigation effect on the DC grid voltage.

Fig. 59: False Data Injection (FDI) attack on the voltage reference value
of the firing angle controller of AC-DC converter in PMSG based wind
power system scenario and mitigation effect on the load power.
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3.3

Index based performance evaluation of the proposed controllers
The performance of the proposed cyber security mitigation techniques has been

evaluated through the voltage index calculation using the following equation:

𝑇

𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = ∫ |∆𝑉𝐷𝐶 | 𝑑𝑡

(13)

0

Where, T is the simulation time for different cases. The lower the value of voltage index,
the better the system performance. In other words, the less deviation of the DC grid terminal
voltage with respect to time ensures the system stability. For obvious understanding of the
controller performance, the percentage improvement has been calculated following the
equation below:

𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑁𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 − 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑁𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟

× 100

(14)

The Table 4 shows the voltage index values for all the scenarios that have been
considered in this study. In that table for some of the cases of PI controller there is no index
values, because on those cases only non-linear controller has been used. From these index
values it is evident that the cyber-attack makes the DC microgrid system very much
insecure, as the voltage index values without the controller are large. Using the proposed
controllers, the system performance improved greatly. However, in all cases, where both
the controllers are used, it is clear from the percentage improvement data that the non-linear
controller is slightly better than the PI controller.
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TABLE 4: VOTAGE INDEX VALUES FOR CYBER-ATTACK
Voltage Index
Attack
Scenario

No
Controller

Non-Linear Controller

PI Controller

Index

Index

Percentage
Improvement
(%)

7.442

0.1104

98.517

0.1518

96.961

Scenario-2

3.927

0.0517

98.684

0.1511

96.152

Scenario-3

4.398

0.1140

97.41

0.1518

96.55

Scenario-4

1.261

0.1713

86.42

-

-

Scenario-5

2.362

0.3382

85.68

-

-

3.763

0.0534

98.58

0.3772

89.976

1.203

0.1512

87.43

-

-

2.052

0.0295

98.56

-

-

0.6604

0.0817

87.63

-

-

0.3191

0.0511

83.99

-

-

4.414

0.996

97.74

-

-

0.3311

0.0418

87.74

-

-

Case-I
Scenario-1

Index

Percentage
Improvement
(%)

Case-II
Scenario-1
Scenario-2
Case-III
Scenario-1
Scenario-2
Case-IV
Scenario-1
Case-V
Scenario-1
Case-VI
Scenario-1
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3.4

Conclusion
This chapter provides the detailed illustration of the different case studies of

cyber-attack on the DC microgrid system. Through the graphical representation, the
impact of cyber-attack on different components of microgrid system has been shown, that
helps determine the severity of the different cases. Along with this, those plots also affirm
the effectiveness of the proposed controllers for mitigation of adverse effects of cyberattacks. In addition, the voltage index measurement and the percentage improvement
calculation clearly show the improved performance and reliability of the proposed
controllers.
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CHAPTER-4
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

4.1

Conclusion
This work explores the effect of different type of cyber-attacks at different

locations and components of the DC microgrid system. This thesis can be concluded as
follows.
•

This work provides a detail modelling of the DC microgrid system
considering the distributed energy resources like PV, fuel cell, PMSG baser
wind power system and most importantly the BES system which is the
essential part of any microgrid system.

•

Two types of mitigation controller, non-linear controller and the PI controller
have been designed and proposed for the mitigation of the cyber-attack in the
DCMG system.

•

The proposed controllers can handle the cyber-attacks properly whether it is
single attack, random attack, repetitive attack or simultaneous attack on the
multiple locations of the DCMG system.

4.2

Contribution of this work
•

This research proposes completely new scope of work on the DCMG system,
as till now nobody has worked on the cyber-attack mitigation techniques on
the DCMG system.
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•

This thesis proposed the design of the non-linear controller that can handle
any type of set point change scenarios, thereby making the controller robust.

•

The multiple attack locations in terms of real components of DCMG system
has been considered in this work.

•

The implementation of the proposed concept will ensure the stability,
reliability and power quality of local area power system by ensuring the usage
of everlasting energy resources with proper control of energy storage.

BROADER IMPACT OF THIS WORK
This research will provide a new approach to the conventional power generation
system and it will have some intellectual, industrial as well as social benefits, as
described below.
•

Most of the industries, data centers, university campuses, hospitals, etc., use their
individual power generation system or the subsystem to meet the power demand.
Again, military bases need mobile means of power so that they can move
anywhere with the power source. A regulated DCMG System can be a good
option for the high-quality source of power.

•

At any means consumers expect uninterrupted power, which can get hampered by
the cyber-attacks. The outcome of this research can be helpful in increasing the
reliability of such DCMG.

•

The university campuses, hospitals, apartments, etc., can build the prototype
based on the outcome of this research.

•

This research can be added to the academic syllabus for any course that relates to
smart grid or advanced power systems study.
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4.3

Future scope of the work
This work can be extended to perform the following research tasks.
•

A robust cyber-attack detection technique by recognizing the patterns of
cyber-attack can be investigated.

•

Other robust solutions to mitigate the adverse effects of cyber-attacks on the
DCMG performance can be explored.

•

As energy storage is an inseparable part of any MG system, more robust
energy storage system using adaptive controllers can be designed for the
DCMG system.
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